Har yili kun yorug'ligi kamayib, daraxtlar yalang'ochlashar ekan, ovning axloqi haqida bahs-munozaralar paydo bo'ladi. Ovchilar bug‘u, o‘rdak, buloq va boshqa karerlarni ta’qib qilish va o‘ldirishni insonparvarlik, zaruriy va tabiiy, shuning uchun axloqiy deb bilishadi. Tanqidchilar ov qilish shafqatsiz va befoyda ish bo'lib, uni amalga oshirishdan uyalish kerak, deb javob berishadi.
Ovchi sifatida men hayvonni otish yoki tuzoqqa tushirish nimani anglatishi haqida hech narsa deya olmayman. Ammo falsafa va axloq fanining talabasi sifatida, menimcha, falsafa bizga har ikki tomonning dalillarini aniqlashtirish, tizimlashtirish va baholashda yordam beradi. Va argumentlarni yaxshiroq tushunish, biz rozi bo'lmagan odamlar bilan gaplashishga yordam beradi.
Ov qilish uchun uchta asos
Asosiy savoldan biri nima uchun odamlar ov qilishni tanlashadi. Atrof-muhit faylasufi Gari Varner ovning uch turini aniqlaydi: davolash, tirikchilik va sport. Har bir tur xizmat ko'rsatish maqsadi bilan ajralib turadi.
Therapeutic hunting involves intentionally killing wild animals in order to conserve another species or an entire ecosystem. In one example, Project Isabella, conservation groups hired marksmen to eradicate thousands of feral goats from several Galápagos islands between 1997 and 2006. The goats were overgrazing the islands, threatening the survival of endangered Galápagos tortoises and other species.
Ovchilik - bu odamlarni ozuqa va moddiy resurslar bilan ta'minlash uchun yovvoyi hayvonlarni qasddan o'ldirishdir. Mahalliy amerikalik qabilalarga kitlarni ovlashga ruxsat beruvchi kelishuvlar, qisman hayvonlarning ularni ovlagan odamlar uchun yashash qiymati bilan oqlanadi.
Aksincha, sportov qilishyovvoyi hayvonlarni lazzatlanish yoki rohatlanish uchun qasddan o'ldirishni nazarda tutadi. Tajribani hayajonlantirgani yoki devorga shox o'rnatilishini xohlagani uchun kiyik orqasidan yuradigan ovchilar sport ovchilaridir.
Bu toifalar bir-birini istisno qilmaydi. Kiyiklarni taqib yurgan ovchi tajribadan zavqlanib, dekorativ shox olishni xohlasa, go'shtni iste'mol qilish, teridan shim yasash va mahalliy kiyik populyatsiyasini nazorat qilishda yordam berish niyatida bo'lishi mumkin. Farqlar muhim, chunki ovga e'tirozlar ov turiga qarab o'zgarishi mumkin.
Odamlarni ov qilishda nima bezovta qiladi: Zarar, zarurat va xarakter
Critics often argue that hunting is immoral because it requires intentionally inflicting harm on innocent creatures. Even people who are not comfortable extending legal rights to beasts should acknowledge that many animals are sentient—that is, they have the capacity to suffer. If it is wrong to inflict unwanted pain and death on a sentient being, then it is wrong to hunt. I call this position "the objection from harm."
If sound, the objection from harm would require advocates to oppose all three types of hunting, unless it can be shown that greater harm will befall the animal in question if it is not hunted—for example, if it will be doomed to slow winter starvation. Whether a hunter's goal is a healthy ecosystem, a nutritious dinner, or a personally fulfilling experience, the hunted animal experiences the same harm.
But if inflicting unwanted harm is necessarily wrong, then the source of the harm is irrelevant. Logically, anyone who commits to this position should also oppose predation among animals. When a lion kills a gazelle, it causes as much unwanted harm to the gazelle as any hunter would—far more, in fact.
Few people are willing to go this far. Instead, many critics propose what I call the "objection from unnecessary harm": it is bad when a hunter shoots a lion, but not when a lion mauls a gazelle, because the lion needs to kill to survive.
Today, it is hard to argue that human hunting is strictly necessary in the same way that hunting is necessary for animals. The objection from necessary harm holds that hunting is morally permissible only if it is necessary for the hunter's survival. "Necessary" could refer to nutritional or ecological need, which would provide moral cover for subsistence and therapeutic hunting. But sport hunting, almost by definition, cannot be defended this way.
Sport hunting also is vulnerable to another critique that I call "the objection from character." This argument holds that an act is contemptible not only because of the harm it produces, but because of what it reveals about the actor. Many observers find the derivation of pleasure from hunting to be morally repugnant.
In 2015, American dentist Walter Palmer found this out after his African trophy hunt resulted in the death of Cecil the lion. Killing Cecil did no significant ecological damage, and even without human intervention, only one in eight male lions survives to adulthood. It would seem that disgust with Palmer was at least as much a reaction to the person he was perceived to be—someone who pays money to kill majestic creatures—as to the harm he had done.
The hunters I know don't put much stock in "the objection from character." First, they point out that one can kill without having hunted and hunt without having killed. Indeed, some unlucky hunters go season after season without taking an animal. Second, they tell me that when a kill does occur, they feel a somber union with and respect for the natural world, not pleasure. Nonetheless, on some level the sport hunter enjoys the experience, and this is the heart of the objection.
Ov qilish tabiiymi?
In discussions about the morality of hunting, someone inevitably asserts that hunting is a natural activity since all preindustrial human societies engage in it to some degree, and therefore hunting can't be immoral. But the concept of naturalness is unhelpful and ultimately irrelevant.
A very old moral idea, dating back to the Stoics of ancient Greece, urges us to strive to live in accordance with nature and do that which is natural. Belief in a connection between goodness and naturalness persists today in our use of the word "natural" to market products and lifestyles—often in highly misleading ways. Things that are natural are supposed to be good for us, but also morally good.
Setting aside the challenge of defining "nature" and "natural," it is dangerous to assume that a thing is virtuous or morally permissible just because it is natural. HIV, earthquakes, Alzheimer's disease, and postpartum depression are all natural. And, as The Onion has satirically noted, behaviors including rape, infanticide, and the policy of might-makes-right are all present in the natural world.
Qattiq suhbatlar
Ov bilan bog'liq boshqa ko'plab axloqiy savollar mavjud. Ovchilar foydalanishi muhimmio'qlar, o'qlar yoki tuzoqlarmi? Madaniy an'analarni saqlab qolish ovni oqlash uchun etarlimi? Qishloq xo‘jaligida yetishtirilgan go‘shtni-emay turib, ovga qarshi turish mumkinmi?
As a starting point, though, if you find yourself having one of these debates, first identify what kind of hunting you're discussing. If your interlocutor objects to hunting, try to discover the basis for their objection. And I believe you should keep nature out of it.
Finally, try to argue with someone who takes a fundamentally different view. Confirmation bias—the unintentional act of confirming the beliefs we already have—is hard to overcome. The only antidote I know of is rational discourse with people whose confirmation bias runs contrary to my own.The Conversation
Joshua Duclos Boston universiteti san'at fanlari kollejining falsafa bo'limining PhD nomzodi.
